Based on the principal-agent theory, we give a theoretical interpretation on evolution of the complex partnerships between the\nonline SCF (supply chain finance) providers in China. First, we describe the principal-agent relationships and analyze the optimal\nprofit-sharing contracts between the banks and the B2B platforms. Then, from a dual perspective of leadership transfer and\nabsolute benefit change, we explain the behavioral choices of the banks in the cooperation. Results show that, at the initial stage of\ngrowth of the platformsâ?? abilities to rate online borrowers, the leadership and the absolute benefit of the banks will suffer a â??double\ndecline,â? which explains why the leading banks in China â??divorcedâ? the B2B platforms during 2011 to 2013. However, as the\nplatformsâ?? rating abilities grow to â??maturity,â? the absolute benefit of the banks will finally exceed its original level, and then the\nrational banks would cooperate with the platforms again even at the expense of losing a portion of their leadership, which answers\nwhy the banks in China have come back to â??remarryâ? the B2B platforms since 2014.
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